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CARACAS 1974 AND GENEVA 1975 
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INTRODUCTION 
Geneva, May 12, 1975-The third 
session of the 3rd United Nations 
Sea Law Conference ended May 9 
after the Third World and other 
small and medium-sized countries 
waged a fierce struggle against the 
maritime hegemonism of the two 
superpowers and again forced 
them into a passive and isolated 
position. 1 
Viewed through the People's Repub-
lic of China's prism of a bipolar world, 
the Sea Law Conferences held at Ca-
racas and Geneva were victories. China 
and the "oppressed nations" had stood 
united to thwart the ambitions of the 
superpowers who were portrayed as 
completely to blame for the failure to 
reach an agreement. It was the super-
powers who wanted to ..... maintain 
their positions of hegemonism and who 
assiduously cling to the outdated legal 
regime of the seas and refuse to aban-
don their control and monopoly over 
the seas and oceans. ,,2 
Despite repeated Chinese protesta-
tions to the contrary, however, an 
examination of a number of key criteria 
would suggest that maritime strength of 
the PRC may stand closer to the ranks 
of the superpowers she is wont to attack 
than to the developing nations she 
claims to support. 
According to Jane's Fighting Ships, 
and The Military Balance, 1974-1975, 
published by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London, for 
example, Peking's navy has more than 
tripled in size since the early sixties, 
with submarine and naval aircraft forces 
ranking third in the world. Her coastal 
defense fleet of fast missile, torpedo, 
and gun boats is considerably larger 
than that of the Soviet Union or the 
United States.3 
Although the PRC's navy is primarily 
designed for coastal defense, China's 
emerging ability and readiness to con-
duct amphibious operations were dra-
matically demonstrated in her recent 
seizure of the Paracel Islands in the 
South China Sea-an operation that 
avoided confrontation with the super-
powers but nonetheless suggests that 
China may be more capable today of 
backing up her strong words about 
sovereignty and jurisdiction than was 
the case in the 1950's and early sixties 
when the U.S. Navy continued to ply 
the waters between Taiwan and the 
mainland despite more than 200 "seri-
ous warnings" from Peking.4 
China's rlShing industry also borders 
on the superpower range. The major 
part of her effort is inland, but even 
discounting their fresh-water catch, the 
PRC is fourth among the world's ocean 
fishing nations and conducts fishing 
operations in 9 of the 19 major world 
fishing areas dermed by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation.s 
China's salt-water fishing fleet has 
been progressively motorized with 
modern vessels equipped with tele-
communications equipment, fish shoal 
detectors, and storage facilities, all of 
which has enabled most fishing villages 
to report increases in each subsequent 
annual catch.6 
Crude oil output, a significant factor 
in determining potential as well as 
actual power, was more than six times 
greater in 1974 than in 1965, permitting 
the PRC not only to meet its domestic 
needs but allowing for an exportable 
surplus.7 According to Western oil 
specialists, China is on the verge of 
becoming one of the world's biggest oil 
producers and exporters.8 The shallow 
floor of the Continental Shelf off the 
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coast of China, extending from the 
Yellow Sea through the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, 
is considered one of the most geologi-
cally promising of the yet largely un-
exploited offshore areas.9 Indeed, in 
December 1974, the maiden voyage of 
China's first domestically designed and 
built drilling vessel, the Kantan (Pros-
pector) was not only successful in strik-
ing oil, but also provided training for a 
technical force and experience in marine 
geological prospecting: 1 0 
Keeping within the basic principle of 
"maintaining independence and keeping 
the initiative in our own hands and 
relying on our own efforts, "II China's 
trade with the outside world has in-
creased 5.66 percent since 1952. The 
PRC has trade relations with more than 
150 countries and trade agreements 
with more than 50 other nations. 1 2 
According to Lloyd's list of qualifying 
flag states, China ranks 23rd in the 
world in shipping tonnage,13 with esti-
mates ranging from Lloyd's official 1.5 
million, to Hong Kong shippers deter-
mination of about 4 million tons.14 
In terms of growth, although the 
Hutung Shipyard in Shanghai boasts of 
setting new records in 1973 with a total 
outPut value of 2~ times that of 1965, 
China still relies on foreign acquisitions 
in the building of her merchant fleet. 
Japan and Great Britain currently domi-
nate the Chinese market for transport 
and communications equipment, fol-
lowed by Holland and the United 
States. In 1974 orders were placed for 
70 cargo ships, including freezer and 
refrigerator vessels, with Japan and a 
number of Western European countries 
as the principal contractors. 1 5 It is also 
claimed in Hong Kong that Peking is the 
biggest ship charterer on the London 
market.16 
In anticipation of an increase of 
international trade, the Chinese have 
expanded and modernized ,the port of 
Shanghai and have improved harbor 
facilities in nine major ports along 
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China's coast, from Laien in the north-
east to Chanchiang in the south. 1 7 
It would appear then that, judging 
from actual and potential maritime 
strength, China's interests at Caracas 
and Geneva should have been consistent 
with, if not parallel to, those of the 
United States, the Soviet Union, and 
other seapowers. Yet the PRC's position 
at these meetings was in support of the 
most radical opponents of the maritime 
nations-those who called for a new 
regime which would severely restrict the 
freedom of navigation for warships and 
for some commercial vessels, limit the 
scope of operations for the major fish-
ing nations, and hobble exploitation of 
the mineral resources of the deep sea-
bed. 
CARACAS-1974 
In 1958 the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea convened 
in Geneva. In the same year, the 
People's Republic of China, a member 
of neither the United Nations nor the 
Law of the Sea Conference, issued its 
own "Declaration on China's Territorial 
Sea." It established a 12 nautical mile 
limit, which it defended against Ameri-
can and British criticism as being a 
sovereign right, consistent with eco-
nomic and defense needs. Further, it 
decreed that all vessels must observe the 
relevant laws and regulations laid down 
by the PRC and that no foreign warship 
might enter China's territorial waters 
without prior permission. 1S 
These restrictions contrary to the 
convention produced at Geneva, were 
aimed primarily at the activities of the 
U.S. 7th Fleet operating in waters 
around Taiwan.1 9 
In addition, the Chinese applied the 
straight baseline method of measuring 
the breadth of their territorial waters, a 
method authorized by international 
agreements for countries such as Nor-
way, with large stretches of indented 
coastline. The result of using this mea-
suring system was to convert the 
Chiunghow Strait and Pohai Bay, 
normally within China's territorial sea, 
into internal waters, precluding the 
rights of innocent passage for foreign 
vessels.2o 
By the end of 1971, however, 
China's isolation fro~ the world com-
munity was over, and her security con-
cerns now encompassed not only the 
U.S. 7th Fleet but the increased activity 
of a growing Soviet Navy in Asian 
waters. 
Territorial Sea. By the time the 
second session of the Third United 
Nations Conference on Law of the Sea 
convened in Caracas, Venezuela, the 
issue of conversion from a 3-mile to a 
12-mile territorial sea was all but passe. 
Most participants, including the United 
States, had reached a consensus on 
including the 12-mile limit in an inter-
national convention. The PRC, however, 
virtually ignored the question of the 12 
miles" and, along with their Albanian 
sp 0 kesman, 2 1 addressed themselves 
only to limits placed on the 200·mile 
economic zone. China constantly re-
peated its position that a nation had the 
sovereign right to determine the extent 
of its territorial sea. 
In his opening remarks to the con-
ference, Chia Shu-fan, leader of the 
Chinese delegation and Vice Minister of 
Foreign Trade, stated: 
We hold that to define the terri-
torial sea and scope of national 
jurisdiction is the sovereign right 
of each country and brooks no 
dictation from one or two super-
powers. Coastal states are entitled 
to reasonably define their terri-
torial sea of an appropriate 
breadth and, beyond it, their ex-
clusive economic or fishery zones 
of appropriate limits in the light 
of their specific natural conditions 
and the needs of their national 
economic development and na-
tional security.2 2 
Straits. The breadth of a nation's 
territorial sea is particularly significant 
because an extension from 3 to 12 miles 
would overlap more than 100 straits 
which had been considered part of the 
high seas.13 The United States, ex-
pressing the impact of this change on 
most of the maritime nations, argued 
that straits used for international naviga-
tion were connecting points for large 
areas of the oceans and that unimpeded 
transit through these straits fell under 
the existing rights of the high seas 
regime.24 
The PRe, on the other hand, defmed 
a strait lying within a territorial sea as 
an inseparable part of that territorial 
sea, with the coastal state having full 
authority to enact laws regulating 
passage of commercial ships and aircraft 
through and over these straits. A coastal 
state could also require prior approval 
for the passage of military vessels.2 5 
The principal thrust of China's stance 
on innocent passage through straits 
centered on the growing strength of the 
Soviet Navy and the rivalry between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. for what 
the PRe charged was "world hege-
mony." "For many years Soviet social-
imperialism has regarded the straits of 
other countries as a life line for its 
aggression and expansion abroad and its 
contention with the other superpower 
for dominance over the sea as well as 
the world," wrote a correspondent for 
the New China News Agency. "It tries 
by every means to secure unimpeded 
passage for its warships and nuclear 
submarines through the straits of other 
countries in order to cruise at will in all 
. the oceans, threatening the peace and 
security of many countries.,,2 6 In doing 
so, the Chinese further accused the 
Soviets of "contempt" for the sover-
eign ty of other nations. 2 7 
One example of such contempt, of-
fered by the Chinese, was a Soviet-
Japanese announcement in March 1972 
that the two countries had come to an 
"official understanding" on making the 
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Straits of Malacca an "international 
strait" in spite of an agreement among 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in 
November 1971 that a cooperative or-
ganization to safeguard the navigation in 
the Malacca and Singapore straits should 
be created and that "internationali-
zation of the Straits of Malacca"z 8 was 
unacceptable. 
The Chinese also chided the Russians 
for revisionist inconsistencies, citing 
both a 1949 decision by the Soviet 
Judge on the World Court affirming the 
right of coastal states to formulate 
regulations for navigation in their terri-
torial straits and the refusal by the 
Russians to allow free transit of foreign 
icebreakers and frigates through their 
own Vilkusky Strait.2 9 
The deputy leader of the Chinese 
delegation, Ling Ching took further 
issue with the "smokescreen" effort by 
the superpowers to obliterate the dis-
tinction between commercial and war-
ships by the use of the term "all ships." 
He also pointed out that while freedom 
of navigation through straits was osten-
sibly aimed at developing international 
trade and that such trade was the 
legitimate desire of the peoples of the 
world, this could hardly be brought 
about by the free passage through straits 
of warships and nuclear submarines.3 0 
The Economic Zone. Both the Rus-
sians and Americans attempted to re-
solve the issue of a 12-mile territorial 
sea and a 200-mile economic zone in an 
"overall treaty package" which would 
include, "provisions for unimpeded 
transit of international straits, and a 
balance between coastal state rights and 
duties within the economic zone. ,,31 
The PRe repudiated this "conditional 
recognition" in exchange for free pas-
sage through sovereign straits of war-
ships and submarines. 3 2 
Fishing. Fishing rights in the eco-
nomic zone brought the strongest chal-
lenge from the Chinese. Again the 
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United States and the Soviet Union 
presented similar plans which provided 
the licensing and regulation of foreign 
fishing fleets by an international au-
thority where a coastal state was unable 
to utilize fully its fishery resources in 
the economic zone_ 
Almost predictably, the People's 
Republic of China once again accused 
the superpowers of knavery, in this case 
of reintroducing the discredited concept 
of preferential rights in the economic 
zone at the expense of the sovereignty 
of the smaller coastal states. In an 
article in the Peking Review, the Chi-
nese labeled the Soviet Union as a 
"super-fishing despot" ·whose outer sea 
and distant water catches, those in 
Asian, African, and Latin American 
waters, made up to three-quarters of her 
total catch. The Chinese accused the 
Russians of exhausting the fishery re-
sources in these areas.3 3 
Ling, in addressing the conference on 
this question, denounced the super-
powers for paying only lipservice to the 
concept of an economic zone but at the 
same time denying the coastal states 
their exclusive economic rights. "We are 
of the opinion," he said, "that a coastal 
state may, in accordance with its wish 
and needs, allow foreign fishermen to 
fish in the areas under its jurisdiction by 
bilateral or regional agreements ... but 
it must not be provided beforehand that 
the coastal state shall have the obliga-
tion to grant foreign states any such 
rights. ,,34 
Scientific Research. Peking's commit-
ment to exclusive jurisdiction clashed 
once again with the American and Rus-
sian proposals in the area of scientific 
research within an economic zone. The 
United States argued that not only did 
many developing countries lack the re-
sources to conduct research, but that a 
"consent regime" supported by China 
and other developing nations would 
increase costs and would undermine the 
validity of scientific findings by virtue 
of the fact that research teams could be 
excluded from some areas of the oceans 
by the coastal states. "Oceanic processes 
do not respect man-made jurisdictional 
boundaries," was the position of Ameri-
can Ambassador John Stevenson.3 5 
The United States then proceeded to 
set forth proposals designed to protect 
the rights of coastal states, including 
advance notification of proposed re-
search, the right of a coastal state to 
participate, the sharing of data and 
samples with the coastal state, assistance 
in interpreting results, publication of 
significant findings, compliance by re-
searchers with international environ-
mental standards, flag state certification 
that the research will be purely scien-
tific and conducted by a qualified insti-
tution, and respect for the jurisdiction 
of the coastal state within its economic 
zone.36 
The Chinese countered with an asser-
tion that: " ... in the hands of the 
superpowers, marine scientific research 
is a tool of contending for maritime 
hegemony and pushing policies of ag-
gression and plunder.,,3 7 Four alterna-
tive principles guiding such research 
were then offered by the PRe. They 
included the prerequisite of prior con-
sent; the right of the coastal state not 
only to participate in research projects, 
but the right of prior approval on the 
publication or transfer of all data and 
results; regulation of scientific research 
in the international sea area by an 
international regime; and assistance by 
the sophisticated maritime community 
to developing nations to enhance the 
latter's capability to conduct research 
independently.3 8 
Pollution Control Once more, on the 
matter of marine pollution prevention, 
the effective difference between Peking 
and developed maritime nations hinged 
on the scope of a coastal zone's juris-
diction. The United States, concerned 
that navigation over almost one-third of 
the oceans' surface would be subjected 
to a multitude of conflicting rules, 
proposed that standards for vessel-
source pollution should be set interna-
tionally through the Inter-Governmental 
Consultive Organization (IMCO), by flag 
states for their own vessels, or by port 
states for vessels using their ports_ 39 
American delegates also tendered 
proposals which would establish dif-
ferent environmental obligations for 
developing and developedstates.4o 
The PRC response to these proposals, 
as articulated by Lo Yu-ju, that "under 
the pretext of 'international standards' 
and 'global measures,' [the super-
powers] attempt to deny the jurisdic-
tion of coastal states and their role in 
the prevention and control of marine 
pollution." Lo conceded that measures 
on an international or regional basis 
were needed, but these measures can in 
no way substitute for antipollution 
regulations by coastal states. He also 
alluded to the proposed "double stand-
ard" of environmental control by 
stating that "global measures" would 
restrict the economic and industrial 
development of the developing coun-
tries.,,41 
The Deep Seabed. The issue of the 
regime and the machinery governing the 
international seabed area was particu-
larly contentious, widening the gulf 
between the advanced nations and the 
Third World, with the People's Republic 
of China vociferously in the latter camp. 
The conflict revolved around the ques-
tions of who shall exploit the resources 
in the area, and what shall be the 
structure, powers, and functions of the 
international machinery. 
The United States took the position 
that access to the rich manganese 
nodules in the deep seabed be guaran-
teed on a nondiscriminatory basis, 
under reasonable conditions which 
would provide the security needed to 
attract the private investments essential 
for development. A portion of the 
revenues earned from this exploitation 
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would be used for international com-
munity purposes, particularly for de-
veloping countries. 
The United States, supported by 
eight Western Europe countries and 
Japan, favored development through a 
system of licensing to private investors 
having the requisite scientific capability. 
Control, rather than regulation, as 
proposed by the opponents to the U.S. 
plan, would rest with an international 
authority with policy guidance coming 
from a broadly representative assembly 
but with decisionmaking authority in 
the hands of a smaller executive 
body.42 
Over 100 nations, including the 
People's Republic of China, supported a 
counterplan submitted by the Third 
World's Group of 77. Under this pro-
posal, all rights to the deep seabed 
would be vested in an international 
authority "on behalf of mankind as a 
whole." The international authority 
would be entitled to exploit the deep 
seabed resources directly, through con-
tracts, joint ventures, and other forms 
of associations, with complete and ef-
fective control in the hands of the 
authority.43 
Ke Tsai-shue, speaking for the PRC, 
further stated that pending the estab-
lishment of an international regime and 
machinery, no state or person should be 
allowed to exploit the deep seabed and 
that all such activities already underway 
should be stopped.4 4 
Ke and others extended the scope of 
the debate on the deep sea area by 
citing relevant United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions calling for peace-
ful uses of the deep seabed. "There-
fore," said Ke, "we must oppose the 
superpowers conducting military opera-
tions in the area under whatever cover. 
The emplacement of nuclear weapons as 
well as activities of nuclear submarines 
in the area shall be prohibited. Scientific 
research and other related activi-
ties ... shall also be subjected to 
appropriate regulation. We are opposed 
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to military espionage carried out under 
cover of scientific research.,,4 5 
The American delegation came to 
Caracas hopeful that at least the politi-
cal substance, if not the technical details 
of a treaty, could be hammered out. As 
it was,'however, Ambassador Stevenson 
could only take heart from the fact that 
most countries wanted to conclude a 
treaty. He saw hope in the fact that 
traditional regional and political align-
ments of states were gradually being 
replaced by informal groups whose 
memberships were based on issues and 
that the number and tempo of private 
meetings, essential to any real bargain-
ing, had increased considerably. Some 
of the participants had moved beyond 
their previous formal positions at these 
unpublicized meetings. Most important, 
according to Stevenson, was the organi-
zation in each committee of comprehen-
sive sets of working papers, making it 
clear what the structure -and general 
content ofthe treaty will be. 
"What was missing in Caracas," said 
Stevenson, "was sufficient political will 
to make hard negotiating choices ... we 
must now move from the technical 
drafting and preliminary exploratory 
exchanges of views ... to the highest 
political levels, involving heads of states 
themselves, to make accommodations 
on these critical issues possible." 
A general declaration of agreement 
on such specific issues as the 12-mile 
territorial sea and the 200-mile eco-
nomic zone could have been achieved at 
Caracas, but the United States opposed 
piecemeal decisions which did not spell 
out key details. American support for 
the 12-mile territorial sea and the 
200-mile economic zone was condi-
tioned on the satisfactory resolutions of 
such issues as the unimpeded passage of 
straits and the rights and responsibilities 
of coastal states in these areas. 4 6 
The single package concept was 
opposed by the People's Republic of 
China. Less concerned than the United 
States over a successful conclusion at 
Caracas, the PRC chose to view trade-
offs and compromises as superpower 
tactics designed to divide the Third 
World and to erode the sovereignty and 
jurisdictional rights of coastal states. 
GENEVA-1975 
The third session of the Law of the 
Sea Conference opened in Geneva, 
Switzerland, on 18 March 1975. There 
were few formal speeches-this was a 
negotiating session where the general 
outlines developed at Caracas were to be 
expanded into a new treaty on law of 
the sea. Despite serious bargaining 
efforts, however, the delegates were 
unable to conclude a convention accept-
able for signature. The only important 
document to emerge from the session 
was a single text on virtually all LOS 
topics prepared by the chairman of each 
of the three committees. This was not a 
negotiated text, but represented, in the 
view of each chairman, the prevailing 
sentiments on the various issues, leaving 
out extreme positions. For the U.S. 
delegation, this procedure is viewed as a 
positive procedural accomplishment 
which should make it easier to negotiate 
an agreement at the next session of the 
LOS conference scheduled for the 
spring of 1976.47 
Although there were few substantive 
changes in the positions taken by the 
People's Republic of China, the United 
States, or the Soviet Union, Geneva did 
expose much of China's hollow rhetoric 
regarding the single-mindedness of the 
Third World's opposition to the super-
powers. Self-interest, disinterest, or 
trade-off possibilities were as much 
motivating factors behind national posi-
tions as was identification with a re-
gional or developing group. The PRC's 
apparent major interest-use of the LOS 
conference as a platform for attacks on 
the Soviet Union and the United States 
-required little shifting from her pre-
vious support for the more radical pro-
posals made at Caracas. 
Territorial Sea. The single text 
emanating out of the second committee 
reflected consensus for a 12-mile terri-
torial sea. China did not comment on 
article 7 of this text which states: 
"Where the establishment of a straight 
baseline ... has the effect of enclosing 
as internal waters areas which previously 
had been considered as part of the 
territorial sea, of the exclusive zone or 
of the high seas, a right of innocent 
passage ... shall exist in these 
waters. ,,48 As cited earlier, China's 
adoption of the straight baseline 
method in 1958 removed the right of 
innocent passage from the Chiunghow 
Strait and Pohai Bay, both formerly 
within China's territorial waters, but 
now considered internal waters.49 
Peking did comment, however, on 
Ecuador and Peru's insistence that they 
had the right to extend their territorial 
waters up to 200 miles. While still 
maintaining their insistence on the 
sovereign right of nations to set their 
own territorial sea limits, the 200-mile 
claim found so little support at Geneva 
from other nations that the Chinese 
used obfuscating language when they 
spoke of "resolutely" supporting the 
struggle of Third World countries to 
safeguard their national resources, 
economy, and sovereignty. They then 
substituted the term "200 mile mari-
time right" in place of territorial sea and 
proceeded to describe, not the terri-
torial sea, but the economic zone.5 0 
Other provisions for the territorial 
sea found in the single text evinced no 
special response from the Chinese 
despite the fact that they ran counter to 
the positions normally taken by the 
PRe. These single text provisions in-
cluded: no restrictions against the sur-
face navigation of submarines through 
territorial waters; no coastal state re-
strictions on the design, construction, 
manning or equipment of foreign ships 
transiting territorial waters; the same 
righ t of innocent passage for warships as 
for commercial vessels; and limitations 
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on the criminal jurisdiction of coastal 
states to foreign ships passing through 
territorial waters.5 1 
Straits_ The American delegation saw 
increasing support at Geneva for its 
position stressing the necessity of guar-
anteed transit for all ships and aircraft 
through straits used for international 
navigation. 5 2 The Chinese held to their 
previous position that: "a strait within 
the limits of a territorial sea, no matter 
whether it is frequently used for inter-
national navigation, constitutes an in-
separable, component part of the terri-
torial sea of a coastal state." They 
argued that innocent passage through 
such a strait should not apply to foreign 
warships. 5 3 
What the PRe refused to recognize 
was that many nonstrait states simply 
were not concerned about innocent 
passage of warships or the exercise of 
coastal state sovereignty and jurisdiction 
in these areas except as restrictions on 
free navigation of straits might affect 
the prices of imports and exports. Other 
nonstrait states, while unwilling to be 
placed on record, recognized that their 
own security depended on the right of 
free transit for either the Soviet or 
American navies.5 4 
Probably the greatest consideration 
that divided the developing world on 
the straits issue was an appreciation by 
some nations that they could use free 
passage through straits as a bargaining 
lever with the superpowers for trade-
offs on other law of the sea issues.5 5 It 
was on this willingness to compromise 
that the PRe found itself out of step 
with many of the members of the Third 
World. 
Economic Zone. Treatment of the 
economic zone in the single text appears 
to be more in line with the positions 
supported by the People's Republic of 
China than with those of the United 
States or the Soviet Union. However, 
U.S. Ambassador Stevenson held a more 
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sanguine view of the text, asserting that 
to a large degree it did establish a 
balance between the rights and duties of 
coastal states and other states having 
vital interests in these areas.5 6 
Contrary to the previously held 
American position, the term "exclusive" 
is applied to the economic zone in the 
title and throughout the second com-
mittee report. Sovereign and jurisdic-
tional rights to exploration, exploita-
tion, and scientific research within the 
zone are granted to the coastal state. 
There are passages, however, which miti-
gate the impact of coastal state control. 
For example, the PRC made much in 
Geneva of the Soviet insistence that the 
exercise of coastal state rights in the 
economic zone give due regard to other 
legitimate uses of the high seas. The 
Chinese argued that inclusion of high 
seas rights distorts the status and nature 
of the economic zone, charging the 
Soviets with wanting to threaten the 
sovereignty and security of these coastal 
states.57 
Article 47 of the single text provides, 
however, that high seas rights of naviga-
tion and overflight shall apply to the 
exclusive economic zone as long as the 
exercise of these rights is not in-
compatible with the provisions outlined 
in the section on the economic zone.5 8 
The article also protects the right of 
foreign nations to lay cables and sub-
marine pipelines in the 200-mile eco-
nomic zone of another coastal state.5 9 
In conformity with overwhelming senti-
ment in favor of freedom of navigation 
and the laying of cables and pipelines, 
the PRC conceded this point in the last 
days at Geneva.6 0 
Fishing_ On fishing rights in the 
economic zone, the single text attempts 
to strike a middle ground between the 
position of complete sovereignty of 
coastal states over fishing resources, a 
stance supported by the PRC, and the 
"preferential rights" proposal of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The 
text provides for the coastal states, not 
an international authority, to determine 
the allowable catch of living resources in 
the exclusive economic zone, but also 
provides that, "where the coastal state 
does not have the capacity to harvest 
the entire allowable catch, it shall, 
through agreements, give other states 
access to the surplus of the allowable 
catch.,,61 The PRC contribution to the 
debate was limited to a continuation of 
her attacks on the Soviet Union as a 
pillager of the fishery resources of 
others.62 
Landlocked Nations_ Throughout the 
Caracas conference and again at Geneva, 
Chinese accounts of the proceedings 
contained oblique remarks about super-
power efforts at dividing the unanimity 
of the developing world. These com-
ments referred to a continuing dispute 
within the Group of 77 over access to 
the resources in the economic zone for 
landlocked and geographically dis-
advantaged states. The single text article 
on this issue provides for participation 
of noncoastal states in the exploitation 
of "living resources" in the economic 
zone of a neighboring coastal state but 
leaves the terms and conditions of such 
participation to subsequent bilateral or 
regional agreements. 6 3 The Chinese 
wholly subscribe to this position. The 
landlocked states supported by the 
United States, do not, however, feel 
that the interests of these geographically 
disadvantaged countries have been ade-
quately protected.6 4 
Missing from the single text provi-
sion, for example, as well as from PRC 
and other coastal state commentaries, 
are any references to the sharing of 
"nonliving" or mineral resources in the 
economic zone_ Most of the coastal 
developing countries completely re-
jected the demands of their landlocked 
neighbors for a share of mineral re-
sources, and the Latin American coastal 
states were not even willing to share 
access to fishery resources.6 5 
Scientific Research. The dispute over 
the requirement of prior consent by the 
coastal state for scientific research in its 
economic zone continued at Geneva 
The Soviet Union modified its position 
by proposing that only fundamental 
scientific research unrelated to explora-
tion and exploitation of resources be 
exempt from prior notification. The 
PRC refused to accept this distinction, 
arguing again that any deviation from 
the principle of prior notification nulli-
fied the jurisdictic)n of the coastal state 
and gave the superpowers "a free hand 
to carry out all furtive activities under 
the pretext of scientific research ... 6 6 
The third committee dealt directly 
with the issue of scientific research, 
apart from concern over rights in the 
economic zone, and made a sharp 
distinction between research related to 
the exploration and exploitation of 
living and nonliving resources, for which 
prior consent is mandatory, and pure 
scientific research. For the latter pur-
pose, notification is required only in 
order to give the coastal state an oppor-
tunity to participate in the research 
project. The coastal state cannot pre-
vent pure research unless it determines 
that the project is not, in its estimation, 
fundamental in nature. In such in-
stances, the dispute can be submitted to 
settlement machinery. 67 
The Deep Seabed. As in Caracas, no 
compromise could be found in Geneva 
for the issue of control over the exploi-
tation of the deep seabed. The single 
text coming out of the first committee 
fairly well encompassed the proposals of 
the Group of 77, providing for an 
international authority to explore and 
exploit the deep seabed directly and for 
control over the authority to be, in 
effect, in the hands of the majority of 
smaller nations. These proposals were 
opposed by the United States and other 
technologically advanced nations but 
supported by the PRC. 
Ambassador Stevenson, in a final 
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statement at Geneva, expressed the 
American delegation's dissatisfaction 
with the apparent trend on a seabed 
protocol when he said: 
The investment in this type of 
project is, as you know, an enor-
mous one. And, in a world where 
we have all felt the effects not 
only of scarcity of vital raw 
materials, but of uncertainty of 
access to them, nations are not 
prepared, in my judgement, to 
subject their access to seabed 
minerals to a system of explora-
tion and exploitation and to a 
decision-making process in which 
they do not have reasonable as-
surances of security of access and 
may not be adequately repre-
sented. Moreover, I do not think 
it will be possible, seen against the 
background of today's develop-
ments in raw material matters, to 
agree to give ultimate powers of 
exclusive exploitation to a single, 
new international entity ... 68 
The inability of the Geneva con-
ference to meet its previously assigned 
deadline for a completed convention 
seemed to affirm the skepticism of some 
observers that no conference involving 
more than 140 countries and over 97 
different issues could ever conclude a 
single treaty acceptable to a majority of 
delegations.69 The major stumbling 
block to an overall consensus was the 
issue of deep seabed exploitation. The 
impact of the oil cartel on Western 
economies and on the world's political 
balance was apparent to the developing 
countries. They were, therefore, acutely 
conscious of the importance of con-
trolling the untapped mineral wealth of 
the seas. For many of these countries, 
including the People's Republic of 
China, Third World domination of the 
deep seabed was crucial if they were to 
create what, in their eyes, would be a 
new, more equitable, world economic 
order. 
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Nevertheless, the American dele-
gation was still hopeful that a more 
favorable accord could be reached at the 
1976 continuation of the Law of the 
Sea Conference_ The United States may 
resubmit, in a revised form, a compro-
mise proposal that would divide the 
deep seabed into areas-some reserved 
for direct exploitation by the interna-
tional authority and others to be 
worked through licensed companies. 
Even though a similar American pro-
posal was rejected at Geneva by the 
Group of 77, the United States believes 
that agreement is so close on other 
issues that a breakthrough on the deep 
seabed impasse could result in a compre-
hensive treaty. 7 0 
On the other hand, the People's 
Republic of China expressed no similar 
optimism or concern for a successful 
conclusion. The closed negotiating 
atmosphere at Geneva denied them the 
wide propaganda platform they enjoyed 
in Caracas, and consequently, on many 
of the law of the sea issues debated at 
Geneva, the Chinese were silent. The 
issues on which they chose to comment 
were those that afforded an opportunity 
to demonstrate solidarity with the Third 
World in opposition to the superpowers 
and to repeat their litany of invectives 
against the Soviet Union. 
CONCLUSION 
The contributions of the People's 
Republic of China at Caracas and 
Geneva were neither creative nor con-
structive. Her positions were often ex-
treme, and despite frequent assertions 
about solidarity with the Third World, it 
is the opinion of some members of the 
U.S. delegation that China's bellicose 
rhetoric had little impact, except on the 
radical minority of the developing 
world. 
Indeed, one member of the U.S. 
delegation feels that the PRC was not 
interested one way or another in the 
outcome of Geneva and may not even 
become a party to a treaty should one 
eventually evolve.71 
Dr. Tao-tai Hsia, Chief of the Far 
Eastern Law Division of the Library of 
Congress, maintains that China does not 
want to be shackled by legal norms such 
as treaties, and even in their formal 
speeches, the PRC delegates were very 
careful to keep their own options 
open. 72 
Peking recognized that these con-
ferences, as have most international 
gatherings in recent years, pitted the 
newly arrived against the powerful and 
established. Exhibiting little respect for 
tradition, for the rules of the past; 
resentful of the leadership positions of 
the superpowers; cognizant of their 
group strength in an international 
forum; taking at face value the Western-
sponsored concept of sovereign 
equality; and caught up in an irresistible 
momentum for change; the Third World 
was determined to rewrite the rules 
governing the use of the seas. China 
made much of this undercurrent to pose 
as the apostle of progress in opposition 
to superpower machinations designed to 
maintain the status quo. 
Even before the second session at 
Caracas came to grips with substantive 
matters, the United States and the 
Soviet Union were cast in the roles of 
selfish obstructionists by the PRC. The 
Chinese accused the Soviets of being in 
concert with the Americans to "obtain 
the right of veto in a disguised form." 
The issue was one of reaching agreement 
on major topics through "consensus," 
which was characterized by the Chinese 
as a ploy by which the superpowers 
hoped to block the will of the majority 
and thereby "maintaih their interests as 
hegemonic powers.,,7 3 
By virtue of her naval strength, her 
ranking among the leading fishing 
nations, her potential as one of the 
foremost oil producers and exporters, 
her rapid growth as a shipping and 
trading nation, and her position as a 
permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, the People's 
Republic of China should qualify, at 
least, for potential status as a super-
power, seeking the same prerogatives 
and advantages as the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. Instead, the PRC has 
vehemently declared that "China is one 
of the countries of the third world 
... China will never be a super-
power ... ,,74 Even the new "Constitu-
tion of the People's Republic of China" 
proclaims, "In international affairs, we 
should uphold proletarian international-
ism. China will never be a super-
power.,,75 
Apart from the PRC's obvious desire 
to ally with and eventually lead the 
majority of states lumped together in 
the Third World, these protestations 
against superpower status can also be 
explained in the way China perceives its 
strengths and interests vis·a-vis her two 
major rivals, the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 
The PRC may be a principal naval 
power in her part of the world, but she 
does not consider herself as having 
worldwide naval ambitions. Capt. John 
R. Dewenter, USN, writing in the May 
1975 issue of the United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, states that in 
about 5 years the PRC will have satu-
rated the Yellow Sea with about a 
hundred submarines, a thousand coastal 
defense craft, and a large number of 
aircraft. He speculates that their objec-
tive is the complete control of the 
adjacent seas rather than the embarka-
tion into distant deepwater ventures. 7 6 
China does not consider herself as num-
ber three in naval power to the United 
States and U.S.S.R., but as a smaller and 
weaker state.77 
In addition, she considers herself as a 
strait state, with concerns over Soviet 
and American encroachment in the 
passages between the Hainan Islands and 
the mainland and through the Formosa 
Straits and Islands. 78 
Although the Chinese are fourth in 
the world in tons of saltwater fishing 
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catches and are fishing in 9 of the 
world's 19 major fishing zones, the great 
bulk of their saltwater catch is taken 
out of the Northwest Pacific zone, 
offshore of the Chinese mainland. Even 
in this area, the PRC trails behind 
Japan, the Soviet Union, and the Re-
public of Korea.79 Compared to Japan, 
the Soviets, and the United States, 
China is not equipped for large-scale, 
long-distance fishing expeditions. She 
lacks technology, exploratory fishing 
vessels, and the requisite number of 
factory ships. 
The PRC is also moving very slowly 
in her oil exploitation. She still relies 
greatly on coal and wood for fuel and 
appears not eager to jump into the 
world market as a major oil exporter. 
Rather than tum to more developed oil 
producing countries for the technology 
necessary to exploit its resources fully, 
China rejects joint ventures and relies on 
its own expertise.8 0 
Captain Dewenter contends that 
China is "stringently husbanding" its oil 
resources in recognition of its potential 
as a source of foreign exchange to 
finance imports necessary for the sys-
tematic development of its industries. 
China is also aware of the political 
importance of oil in a world of in-
creasing need and decreasing supply. 8 1 
While her merchant marine grows, 
her port facilities expand, her trade and 
trade agreements for foreign countries 
increase, China, for her size and poten-
tial, is still a minor commercial nation 
on the international scene. Once again, 
this is partly by design. An article in 
Jen-min Jib-pao explains the principles 
governing China's foreign trade: 
... the state must be in control of 
it and the condition of depend-
ence on or control of it by foreign 
powers must be thoroughly de-
molished. While mainly relying on 
her own manpower, material and 
wealth, and trying to increase her 
exports, the country may import 
a certain amount of materials for 
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construction and consumer goods 
according to the needs and possi-
bili ties_ In no circumstances 
should a country rely on imports 
to meet the needs of national 
construction and daily necessities 
... We hold that political inde-
pendence cannot be separated 
from economic independ-
ence ... 82 
China exports an insignificant pro-
portion of its national product, but even 
that is done mainly for the purpose of 
raising the foreign exchange required to 
import goods and equipment to supple-
ment the general development strategy 
of self-reliance. 8 3 
On the evidence, therefore, China is 
not yet a superpower in a class with the 
Soviet Union and the United States, but 
neither is she a part of the relatively 
impotent developing countries in whose 
interests China purportedly spoke. 
Peking skirted this dichotomy during 
the Caracas and Geneva negotiations by 
constant and repetitious attacks on the 
superpowers to emphasize her support 
for the Third World. At the same time, 
she never fully committed herslef so as 
to allow flexibility of position. 84 Flexi-
bility through the lack of international 
constraints may be viewed by Peking as 
preferable to a law of the sea regime, 
which, on the surface, might appear to 
be more advantageous. For example, a 
200-mile exclusive economic zone, 
which the Chinese have supported, 
could serve to exclude the Japanese 
fishing fleet from most of the Yellow 
Sea and parts of the East China Sea.8 5 
This would leave the Koreas and Taiwan 
as contenders with China for the fishery 
resources in that area. Would the ex-
clusion of Japan be in China's best 
interest: For 20 years both nations have 
peacefully worked these waters under 
provIsIons of a nongovernmental 
fisheries arrangement and are currently 
negotiating a new agreement at a gov-
ernmental level. 8 6 In spite of the fact 
that at Caracas and Geneva, Japan was 
the most implacable foe of the 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone, reflecting her 
worldwide fishing interests, the Chinese 
never singled out Japan, as they did the 
Soviet Union, for attack as a selfish 
exploiter of these resources. 
A 200-mile exclusive economic zone, 
together with recognition of a coastal 
state's jurisdiction over that portion of 
the Continental Shelf that extends 
beyond the 200 miles, could also be to 
China's advantage. The shallow waters 
of her contiguous seas provide her with 
a Continental Shelf as far as the Oki-
nawa Trough. Taken together with her 
claim to ownership of the Senkaku-
Tiasyut'ai Islands (contended by 
Japan),8 7 the PRC, under a new law of 
the sea mandate, effectively could con-
trol much of the potentially oil-rich 
areas under her adjacent seas. These are 
areas presently being mapped for ex-
ploitation by Japan and South Korea, 
under strong Chinese protest.8 8 
While supporting the 200-mile ex-
clusive economic zone, the Chinese were 
unwilling to compromise on the issues 
of straits, fisheries, and scientific re-
search within the zone. China also sup-
ported the principle of coastal state 
jurisdiction over the extended Conti-
nental Shelf, but opposed the American 
proposal that profits extracted from this 
area be shared internationally. If the 
People's Republic of China truly wanted 
a convention that would legalize the 
200-mile economic zone, she might have 
played the "trade-off" game as did most 
of the delegate nations. That she did not 
choose to compromise, even on issues of 
peripheral concern to her, such as pollu-
tion, suggests that China does not view a 
definitive treaty on law of the sea as 
being consistent with her interests or 
modus operandi. 
Much of East Asia is either under 
Communist rule or is intimidated by the 
fear of an extending Communist influ-
ence. Within this geographic area and in 
such an atmosphere, the People's 
Republic of China must feel a sense of 
ascendancy. It would appear, therefore, 
that whatever arrangements are to be 
made on fishing rights and oil exploita-
tion, the PRC would rather have control 
over its bargaining prerogatives than be 
confined by provisions of an interna-
tional convention. 
Finally, the PRC's performance at 
the Caracas and Geneva conferences 
demonstrates the profound impact of 
tradition, history, and Marxism on 
modern China's attitude toward interna-
tional relations. 
The ruling principle of order in dynas-
tic China was the Sinocentric ideology of 
the Heavenly Mandate, a concept which 
recognized no equals to the Emperor. 
That being the case, there existed no basis 
for international relations that were un-
derstood to be agreements among equals. 
Foreign policy, such as it was, revolved 
around ritual and tribute. 39 
China's early experience with rules of 
international conduct imposed by the 
.west left an additional legacy of sus-
picion and cynicism. One of China's 
early diplomats wrote in 1891: "Inter-
national law is just like Chinese statu-
tory law-reasonable but unreliable. If 
there is right without might, right will 
not prevail. ,,9 0 
From 1949, when the Communists 
assumed power, to 1971, when they 
were admitted into the United Nations, 
the PRC was in virtual isolation from 
most international forums. In this 
period, Chinese scholars began to ex-
amine international law in the context 
of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Starting 
with the assumption that existing inter-
national law was designed by Western 
nations to sanctify their encroachments 
upon non-Western people, Chinese legal 
scholar Chu Li-ju wrote: 
International law is an instrument 
for settling international prob-
lems. If this instrument is useful 
to our country, to the socialist 
cause, or to the cause of peace for 
peoples of the world, we will use 
it. But if it is disadvantageous 
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... we will not use it, and we 
should create a new instrument to 
replace it.9 1 
It is worth noting that the Chinese 
word for international law is Cheng-fa, 
literally translated as "politics-Iaw.,,9 2 
Another Sino-Marxist concept holds 
that the ultimate objective of interna-
tional relations is not designed to achieve 
stability, a position underlying most 
Western diplomacy, but continuous fric-
tion as represented in the class struggle 
and permanent revolution. 93 
Prime Minister Chou En-lai, in a 
speech delivered at the 4th National 
People's Congress, characterized the 
present international situation as "great 
disorder under heaven. " The Peking 
pUblication Jen-min Jib-pao picked up 
this phrase when it wrote: 
The international situation 
marked by great disorder under 
heaven is a good thing. It has 
upset the old world order, im-
perialism and colonialism, and 
especially the formations of the 
two superpowers. It has aroused 
the people of various countries 
and enabled them to get steeled 
through struggle and march for-
ward with big strides.94 
There is some doubt that the dif-
ferences that separated the various 
nations at Caracas and Geneva can be 
compromised sufficiently at the next 
scheduled session of the law of the sea 
conference in April 1976. It is doubtful 
too that should a document emerge, the 
People's Republic of China would 
become a signatory. As long as some of 
the nations of the world observe the old 
regime of the seas, the PRC can retain 
its flexibility by continuing to reject 
principles of international law to which, 
she may argue, she is not a party. And 
as long as other nations of the world 
contribute to a growing anarchy of the 
seas through unilateral deviations from 
accepted international legal norms, the 
Chinese can continue to exult in "great 
disorder under heaven. " 
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